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Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient
Environment Information
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE*
INTRODUCTION
Information gaps are a pervasive reality in many areas of regulation, especially
environmental regulation. Among the regulatory strategies viewed as most prone to
implementation failures due to such information gaps are ambient environment
strategies that start with assessment of ambient conditions and tailor regulatory
obligations to the state of the environment. Such schemes demand information and
tailored regulatory responses that are often beyond the capacity of science or
regulatory resources.' Others, however, criticize regulatory strategies for being context
blind.2 Both criticisms have undoubted merit, yet many regulatory schemes actually
involve a hybrid strategy that utilizes what this paper will call "adjudicatory triggers"
in conjunction with ambient environment strategies. Such adjudicatory trigger
strategies require new gathering and analysis of information about environmental
conditions and implemented realities before permits or other approvals can be
obtained. Permits or approvals either will be adjusted in light of ambient conditions or
in some instances will be denied as the result of such analyses.
These regulatory schemes are familiar to lawyers and environmental policy
analysts, yet have not been characterized as suggested here. Like "speaking in prose
without knowing anything about it" the benefits of adjudicatory trigger strategies have
perhaps gone unnoticed due to their ubiquity. 3 Only if one thinks about regulatory
* Professor of Law, Emory Law School. This paper draws on remarks and discussion at a
conference entitled, Missing Information: The Environmental Data Gaps in Conservation and
Chemical Regulation, held on March 24, 2006 at Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington. The author thanks the participants of that conference and research assistants
George Evans and Leo Kogan.
1. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V.- Aftershock and
Prelude, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,385, 10,386 (2002) [hereinafter Aftershock and Prelude]
("Ambient-based management has not worked well in any media-air, water, or waste.");
Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 58 (2000) ("The
science, money, manpower, and political will necessary to make ambient controls work have
been found lacking in virtually every program that has depended on them, including air and
water quality, and hazardous waste cleanup."); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning'" Regulatory Reforms, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985) (noting difficulties in successfully implementing ambient air
standards).
2. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335-40 (1985) (criticizing Best Available Technology strategies); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 627-31 (1991) (same).
3. In Molire's play Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Monsieur Jourdain asks something to be
written in neither verse nor prose. A philosophy master says to him, "Sir, there is no other way
to express oneself than with prose or verse." Jourdain replies, "By my faith! For more than forty
years I have been speaking prose without knowing anything about it, and I am much obliged to
you for having taught me that." MOLItRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, Act I, sc. 4, reprinted
in EIGHT PLAYS BY MOLItRE 345-46 (Morris Bishop trans., Random House 1957) (1670).
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efficacy through a lens that seeks to see how well information is elicited, found, or
remains missing-as did the conference on "data gaps" that led to this paper--does it
become evident that several of environmental law's most common schemes include the
"adjudicatory trigger" strategy. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the
most obvious version of such a law. Under NEPA, other major federal actions trigger
government requirements to gather and analyze information about environmental
impacts. Other less obvious key statutory provisions, especially in the Clean Air and
Water Acts, as well as several other laws, include their own adjudicatory information
trigger elements.
A recent scholarly backlash against regulatory "fine tuning" and an often related
scholarly embrace of technology-based regulatory approaches question the efficacy of
schemes relying on ambient environmental information.4 Such schemes do sometimes
require heroic diligence and information facility that is unlikely to occur in the real
world. The adjudicatory trigger strategies discussed here, however, show that there is,
in fact, a regulatory middle ground. Adjudicatory trigger strategies may offer lessons
for other regulatory challenges-such as chemical safety data gaps-arising under
regulatory schemes that sometimes utilize neither adjudicatory approval procedures nor
permits, both of which typically utilize informational adjudicatory triggers. By
combining permit incentives with a demand for environmental information, new
information will be elicited. The amount of information about regulatory performance
and environmental conditions will seldom be comprehensive, but it will at least be
incrementally increased. At this point, unfortunately, compilation and analysis of such
data from diverse sources is not a statutory requirement in regimes relying on
adjudicatory triggers.
This Article will provide examples of adjudicatory triggers primarily through brief
explication of a case study of the 1970s and 1980s Westway litigation. It then provides
brief explanations of several representative regulatory examples. As revealed by the
Westway story and the regulatory examples, adjudicatory triggers often serve as a
useful mechanism to overcome the incentives of governments and private actors to
ignore or undersupply environmental information. An applicant's interest in a permit
grant or other individualized regulatory approval necessitates gathering of new
information that often did not previously exist. Proponents and opponents of the
regulatory approval, as well as regulators fearful of being sued for an allegedly
unjustified decision, will all share interest in gathering information supporting their
views or decision. These diverse stakeholders will seldom share goals, but in the
adjudicatory trigger setting, all will have incentives to gather relevant information.
Nevertheless, such schemes, as currently utilized, threaten to provide little
comprehensive assessment or lookback review, plus they can lead to marginalization
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens. Citizens and NGOs will often
find it hard to command the resources necessary to effectively participate in the
4. See Latin, supra note 1, at 1312-13 (labeling technology-based regulation as "more
capable of implementation"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:
The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DuKE L.J. 729 (1991) (offering a
systematic defense of technology-based regulation); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 86 (2000) (characterizing technology-
based standards as "one of the most important innovations in U.S. environmental law").
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investigative and analytical process initiated by such adjudicatory triggers. In addition,
excessive reliance on any one actor in such regulatory schemes can encourage strategic
gathering and presentation of data, thereby leading to biased conclusions and the
possibility of skewed regulatory decisions. Questions remain about what actors should
play roles in such regulatory schemes. In addition, as is often the case, informational
burdens and presumptions in light of uncertainty are critical to the efficacy of schemes
utilizing adjudicatory triggers to require gathering and assessment of ambient
environment information.
Part I provides examples of adjudicatory trigger strategies in the law, especially
highlighting the history and lessons of the Westway battles to illuminate adjudicatory
trigger strategies' actual functioning. Part II examines adjudicatory trigger strategies
in light of theoretical and empirical explanations for regulatory data gaps and related
incentives of regulatory stakeholders. Part III closes by discussing problems with
adjudicatory trigger strategies and suggests responsive legal modifications.
1. ADJUDICATORY TRIGGER STRATEGIES IN APPLICATION
Adjudicatory trigger strategies are evident in numerous environmental statutes and
regulations. The most obvious example is NEPA, which, almost in its entirety, is a
statute based on the concept that an individual regulatory act, such as a permit grant,
triggers an agency obligation to disclose, analyze, and receive comment regarding
associated environmental impacts. NEPA can also be triggered by acts that are more
legislative in nature, such as promulgation of regulations, but NEPA is most applicable
to this paper as a law triggered by an adjudicatory request.5 Other laws-such as the
Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Endangered Species
Act-have provisions that similarly utilize an adjudicatory trigger strategy, but they
would less readily be identified in such terms by most regulatory lawyers and scholars.
To more fully explicate what is meant in referring to adjudicatory triggers, this
section starts by telling, in concise form, the tale of the ill-fated Westway highway and
park project. 6 This multi-billion dollar mega-project in New York City, proposed for
placement in the Hudson River, was ultimately defeated in 1985 after a fourteen-year
battle. The project's defeat was largely due to information elicited by adjudicatory
trigger elements and linked structures and presumptions in NEPA, CWA, and CAA. In
briefer form, other statutes and regulations that include an adjudicatory trigger strategy
are summarized.
5. See, Silvia L. Serpe, Reviewability of Environmental Impact Statements on Legislative
Proposals After Franklin v. Massachusetts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 413 (1995) (reviewing cases
undercutting reviewability of legislative NEPA reviews and contrasting treatment of typical
environmental reviews of regulatory actions).
6. This brief retelling of the Westway tale draws on my ongoing work on a book-length
project with the working title of Westway, the City, and the Art of Regulatory War. I also draw
on this Westway research, especially underlying documentary work, interviews, and case
analysis in William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J. L. & POL. 323 (2005).
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A. The Westway Tale
The Westway project was first proposed in the early 1970s.7 It was a proposed
highway and park, which in its final proposed design would have run 4.2 miles both
adjacent to and actually in the Hudson River. For much of its length, a highway
replacing the decrepit West Side Highway would have been within a massive new
landfill placed along the western edge of the lower portion of Manhattan, stretching up
to the midtown area. This huge fill would have stretched as far as a thousand feet into
the Hudson. It would have replaced piers, pilings, warehouses, and shipping facilities.
Huge amounts of newly developable land-ninety-seven acres, to be exact-would
have sat atop the landfill and on existing upland areas that were part of the project. 8 A
ninety-four acre park would also have been built above the new sunken highway,
displacing several miles of the Hudson's flowing waters. 9 Thirty-six acres of land
would be dedicated to the highway interchanges and ramps, and additional roadway
would have been under the landfill in a tunnel. 10
The project was possible for financially strapped New York City because this
section of highway was added to the Federal Interstate Highway System. By gaining
that designation, its highway construction costs were borne ninety percent by the
Federal Government, and ten percent by the state. In addition, once the city and state
chose a plan known as the "modified outboard plan," which placed most of the
highway in the river in fill with a park and developable land on the fill or on adjacent
former surface streets, it avoided much direct displacement of existing uses. At first,
little opposition was anticipated by project planners although several environmentally
oriented federal agencies provided comments expressing concerns about environmental
impacts, especially air pollution and water impacts. However, once federal
transportation laws were amended in the early 1970s to allow recipients of Federal
interstate highway funds to "trade-in" such funds for mass transit and especially after a
1976 amendment allowed construction amounts to increase with anticipated increased
construction costs, citizen opposition was galvanized. New York City's mass transit
system, especially its subways, were in dire need of repairs and upgrades and were
used far more intensively by New Yorkers than were the city's highway links. By the
end of the battle, close to two billion dollars in project funds were eligible for either
the Westway project, or most of those funds could be traded in for a more modest road
and mass transit funding.
Numerous local, state, and federal laws were implicated by this project, but for
purposes of this paper NEPA, CAA, and CWA were most important in how they
served as adjudicatory triggers, which lead to elicitation and gathering of several
7. The facts and project description are found in many hundreds of documents. The
opinions cited below describe the project basics. The New York Times provided a concise but
thorough description of the project and battles up until the eve of the final 1985 court trials,
decisions and concurrent political maneuverings. See Sam Roberts, Battle of the Westway: Bitter
10- Year Saga of a Vision on Hold, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1984, at B4; Sam Roberts, For Stalled
Westway, a Time of Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1984, at BI.
8. Westway Record of Decision, US Army Corps of Engineers at 3-5 (January 24, 1985)
(New York District).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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bodies of information that had previously been lacking. Project proponents were
concerned that without adequate disclosure and investigation of conditions,
unfavorable project treatment or permit denial would follow. Still, temptations to
squelch unfavorable information proved critical to Westway's ultimate defeat in the
courts and rebuffs from Congress late in the battle. Those judicial and legislative
defeats proved critical when state and city officials had to decide whether to battle on
or accept trade-in dollars.
NEPA was triggered by several aspects of this project, including: the grant of
federal interstate highway funds; approvals that were needed under the CAA; a permit
needed under the Rivers and Harbors Act; and, most significantly, the CWA's Section
404 "dredge and fill" permit essential to the massive filling that Westway entailed.
Given the size of the project and its many impacts, this was not an instance where
proponents sought completely to avoid NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
obligations. Instead, this project immediately went into the stage of drafting an EIS
around 1974, only four years after NEPA's enactment. In a decision that was unusual
then and would be rare today, the actual EIS drafting was directed not by one of the
key federal agencies, but by a private consulting firm hired by New York State. This
firm, SYDEC, was headed by a former Federal Highway Administration
Administrator, Lowell Bridwell. SYDEC, in turn, relied on consultants for work on the
EIS.
The EIS, in its draft and final form, was impressive and massive. It was filled with
diagrams, pictures, and discussion of virtually all aspects of the project. It predicted
little in the way of harms. It stated that traffic would flow more smoothly and the park
and new shoreline would improve the aquatic environment. These assertions were soon
tested in the comment process, eventually in agency tribunals before special masters,
and finally in federal court.
The initial legal hook utilized by mass transit proponents and clean air advocates
who opposed Westway was to argue that permitting Westway would violate New York
City's federal CAA obligations. Under New York City's State Implementation Plan
(SIP), the City had to adopt enforceable strategies to protect air quality. Among the
measures in the SIP at that time was an "indirect source permit" program. New York
State, which administered the Clean Air SIP and permitting process, would have to
determine that permitting an indirect source like Westway would not attract new cars
and pollution to the area and thereby exacerbate several areas of the City's
nonattainment with the Federal National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
This challenge largely turned on whether the larger road, easier transportation flow,
and the ninety-seven acres of new development would bring an increased number of
cars onto the highway and possibly into New York City, causing deterioration of air
quality. Project proponents conceded it would bring many thousands of new cars onto
the Westway itself, but they claimed that with improved traffic flow, ventilation
systems, and the tunnel construction, the project would either be air quality neutral or
improve the air. The leading citizen opponent, Marcy Benstock of the Clean Air
Campaign, allied with several other citizen and environmental groups, and, assisted by
their lawyers, challenged these assertions. They claimed that the project would add to
city congestion and degrade the air, as would more truck traffic along the West Side
and in Westway's tunnel. As this permit application was pending before the state, the
20081
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regional director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) for
the region, Eckardt Beck, stated he disapproved of Westway. 1 While it was not at that
moment deciding on a permit, US EPA oversaw state SIP planning and compliance. To
the consternation of federal, state, and city officials, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) commissioner, Peter Berle, on an appeal from a
permit hearing, denied the permit after finding that New York State's Department of
Transportation, the permit applicant, had failed to carry its burden. 12
Throughout the CAA portions of this battle, substantial new information and
techniques were explored for measuring cars and their air pollution impacts. The
tradeoffs of car mixes, car speeds, tunnel ventilation designs, shifts in driving patterns,
and even parking plans were all scrutinized closely. The big question was whether
modeling of anticipated uses indicated that Westway would exacerbate New York
City's CAA nonattainment problems, especially its carbon monoxide nonattainment
status. Lengthy administrative hearings about air permits and impacts substantially
added to the mix of information known about traffic impacts. Here, as in the other
examples discussed below, the permit applicant's desire for a permit and regulators'
legal obligations, as well as opponents' desire for defeat of Westway, led all the parties
to gather and create new kinds of data and modeling that did not previously exist.
Expert panels debated air issues, and citizens and others participated in the
questioning. 13
In this setting of political hardball and with billions in potential benefits and
patronage at stake, both federal and state leaders acted. If the law was a hindrance, at
least new decision makers might utilize their discretionary latitude to grant Westway
project applications. Beck was reassigned to Washington and replaced by an
administrator expected to be more amenable to Westway.14 Berle was fired, and he too
was replaced with a more congenial official. 15
By the time of a second round of permit testimony, proponents revealed modest
project revisions to address air quality concerns. In particular, project proponents,
assisted by lawyers and engineers, discovered that minor changes to tunnel entry and
exit points consisting of little more than fences and bushes-what came to be known as
the "briar patch" solution-would keep citizens away from high pollution
concentrations and allow dissipation of carbon monoxide sufficient to avoid violations
of the law. Critics decried this "briar patch" solution, but with this change Clean Air
Act violations no longer appeared likely. With the changes in project design and
agency personnel, the DEC granted the permit and the US EPA took no action under
11. Paul R. Pescatello, Westway: The Road from New Deal to New Politics 267-68 (Jan.
1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
12. See Michael B. Gerrard, The Saga of Westway, AMicus J., Fall 1980, at 10, 12-13.
13. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER FROM ALBERTJ. ROSENTHAL, HEARING OFFICER, IN
THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE WESTSIDE HIGHWAY PROJECT FOR A PERMIT TO
CONSTRUCT AN INDIRECT SOURCE OF AIR CONTAMINATION, at 2-3 (Sept. 13, 1977) (discussing
hearings, expert panels and questioning formats).
14. Gerrard, supra note 12, at 13.
15. Id. at 12.
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its SIP reviewing authority. The underlying law and regulations were not changed, but
the minor project redesign and personnel changes did the trick. 16
The combination of new information about traffic and car pollution and careful
analysis about how project design around entry and exit tunnels could address potential
violations led to improved knowledge and a design cure. The kinds of analyses of
traffic patterns developed in connection with Westway and other projects during the
early days of NEPA and the CAA are still used today, in updated and improved form.
The CWA concerns, especially concerning landfill impacts, proved a thornier
challenge. Most significantly for much of what followed, the initial EIS claimed that
the interpier environments that would be displaced by Westway were "biologically
impoverished" and virtually devoid of macroorganisms. Elsewhere, this environment
was characterized as a "biological wasteland." Intuitively, these claims seemed about
right. At that time, the Hudson had not started to show the benefits of the federal Clean
Water Act's protections. It was laden with debris, fecal matter, and assorted industrial
effluents. Primitive sewage treatment efforts were just getting underway.
Had these claims of no impact been accurate, Westway would likely exist today.
Unfortunately for Westway's supporters, underlying technical documents contained
data that proved the opposite. Some of this data pre-dated the Westway project, but
additional sampling was undertaken as part of the EIS investigatory project. This initial
data gathering and new sampling constituted a classic adjudicatory trigger leading to
elicitation of new information. Surmise about fish could be tested against actual newly
gathered information about Hudson fisheries.
Project opponents retained a fisheries expert to analyze the underlying data that had
been gathering and summarized by Westway's proponents in the EIS. The EIS
fisheries consultants and EIS drafters for the state, however, had not made this data
easily accessible. Nowhere other than in underlying technical data documents had the
proponents presented results about the interpier area where Westway would actually be
placed. Instead, the proponents had buried the reality of abundant fish in the area by
averaging transects across the width of the river. By averaging the fish-laden interpier
area and more rapidly flowing and sparsely populated central river areas, tables and
diagrams accompanying the EIS made it appear that fish populations were small and
insignificant. As the opponents' fisheries expert exclaimed to an ally after first seeing
the data, the EIS claims that the interpier areas where Westway would go were a
biological wasteland or biologically impoverished were false: "the place [was]
crawling with fish."17
In particular, data revealed that striped bass, a fish in an imperiled state on the East
Coast, made particularly intensive use of the Westway interpier areas during portions
of their first two years of life. The EIS presentation, however, neither conceded this
nor presented data in a straightforward way. As stated by trial judge Thomas Griesa
after the first major CWA trial, the Westway advocates' "graph purporting to deal with
this data... [was] misleading, since it average[d] the data in such a way as to show the
numbers of striped bass in the interpier area as only about one-third of what they
actually were."' 18 He characterized this as a "sleight of hand."' 19 Even more misleading,
16. See Albert K. Butzel, Recapturing New York City's Waterfront, Part I. The Demise of
Westway and the Birth of Hudson River Park, 13 ENvTL. L. N.Y. 217, 218 (2002).
17. Interview of Michael Gerrard, Partner, Arnold & Porter, LLP (Oct. 2000).
18. Action for Rational Transit v. W. Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225, 1247
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the qualititative EIS language speaking of the area as a "wasteland" and
"impoverished" further left the impression that the area was environmentally
insignificant.
This crucial misrepresentation, exacerbated by supportive text statements, started
the unraveling of a seemingly unstoppable project. Despite the ongoing support of
several presidents, governors, mayors, and senators plus strong support from unions,
real estate companies, banks, and much of the business community, Westway was
quickly in a defensive posture from which it never recovered. The EIS investigation,
claims of no harm, and disclosure of contradictory underlying data set in motion even
more close scrutiny.
20
The NEPA EIS was in turn linked to the Army Corps' consideration of the state's
requested Section 404 "dredge and fill" permit. This application, and the Army Corps'
assessment of it, were closely linked to fisheries information relevant to the EIS.
Section 404 permits are not "right to pollute" laws such as the CAA's or CWA's air
discharge or point source permit limitations. Under those schemes, unless a receiving
environment is in violation of relevant standards or a new pollution addition will create
violations, most applicants can pollute, provided they comply with numerical
limitations.
Section 404 permits are different. The statutory language and implementing
regulations-further fleshed out in interpretive materials, adjudicatory actions on
particular permits, and case decisions-created then and still create today a strong
presumption against any use of fill in "waters of the United States."'2' This
presumption becomes a virtual prohibition if such fill will cause significant
degradation of an important aquatic habitat. The burden is therefore on an applicant to
prove that its proposed fill should overcome either the usual permit denial or the
especially strong protective presumptions and near mandatory veto if the fill and
resulting degradation is in a significant aquatic habitat. The permit applicant or the
government can seek to come up with compensatory wetlands or mitigate away harms,
but, there too, the burden is on the applicant to prove it deserves to overcome the
denial presumption.
Due to the EIS conclusion of no harm and similar conclusions in the Section 404
permit proceeding, in 1981, the Army Corps granted the essential Section 404 permit.
Earlier federal natural resource agency objections had led to elevation of this decision
to the Corps Division Engineer, but he sided with the district's initial decision to grant
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 669 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1983), and aff'd in part, rev"d in part sub nom.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 1248.
20. This heightened scrutiny was not due just to the Clean Water Act's requirements. The
backpedaling and inaccuracies triggered more rigorous review under well established, but
seldom utilized elements of "arbitrary and capricious review" set forth in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). With inadequate fact finding or other
irregularities, litigants and courts are given greater latitude to go behind the administrative
record and test government claims. Id.
21. The regulations at the time were the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specifications of
Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Materials, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1984) (EPA regulations), and
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1) (1984) (Army Corps of Engineers regulations); see also Buttrey v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1180(5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the presumption against the
alteration of wetlands "is very strong").
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the permit. In 1981, no objections or elevation occurred, and the US EPA declined to
exercise its veto power under Section 404.
Citizen opponents' discovery of EIS inaccuracies and statistical manipulations,
confirmed by commenting federal agencies' criticisms, led citizens to file challenges in
the district court. There, the information elicited due to NEPA and Section 404 was
quickly challenged. The project's lawyers found themselves on the defensive. Sensing
defeat if Judge Griesa were not presented with a more complete picture and additional
supportive materials, the defendants surrendered their usual insistence on confining
court challenges to the underlying administrative record and the agency's stated
rationale. This more open administrative challenge could never have happened had it
not been for information elicited by the adjudicatory triggers of NEPA and Section 404
analysis.
Unfortunately for the Westway champions, two trials during 1981 and 1982
challenging the Westway EIS and the associated approvals revealed the questionable
underpinnings of the claims of no harms and the falsity of the assertion that the
interpier areas were biological "wastelands." Demonstrative charts showing the
statistical realities of fish populations were presented by the citizen plaintiffs.
Westway's proponents could not effectively explain away the disparity, and the origin
of the key misleading EIS language remained a mystery and a subject of odd memory
lapses. Only when sheepish lawyers admitted that a lawyer with Beveridge &
Diamond, counsel for the New York State Department of Transportation, had drafted
the key EIS passages was the mystery solved.22 Matters were not helped when the key
Army Corp decision maker, the district engineer, revealed he had been negotiating a
new job with the permit applicant's main engineering consulting firm. All of these
disclosures led the judge to conclude that the EIS and the related approvals lacked the
requisite accuracy and good faith basis. The trial judge in two trials invalidated the
permits and remanded the project's permit applications for new consideration
following accurate and complete disclosure. Although some of the trial court's more
extraordinary injunctive relief was rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
the appellate court upheld the trial court's key EIS conclusions and permit
invalidations, as well as the requirement of more detailed Army Corps
recordkeeping.23
What ensued between 1982 and 1985 could fill hundreds of pages. First, both New
York State and the United States Congress held investigative hearings and issued
reports seeking to find out more about what had happened. Rather than finding that a
lone federal judge had been unduly alarmed, as many expected then and still
22. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1380-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd in part, rev'd inpart Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d
Cir. 1983) (subsequent history omitted) (discussing origin of misleading consultant report
language that influenced EIS language, and stating that after the second trial on Section 404
issues, Gary Baise of Beveridge & Diamond advised the court of an attorney-client
memorandum with this language found by the court to be inaccurate). The court indicated other
Westway proponents were accountable for the "fallacious nature of that material," but also
stated that "the court is compelled to say that it sees no justification whatever for Beveridge &
Diamond setting forth a statement of facts which was so divorced from the truth." Id. at 1381.
23. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1032, 1035 (2d Cir. 1983).
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sometimes claim today,24 both the federal and state investigations found even more
irregularities and concessions of misleading behavior by Westway's champions. Both
hearings led to reports that made recommendations for structural changes to discourage
undue conflicts of interest, which could lead to overzealous advocacy.25
As these legislative investigations proceeded, Westway's advocates tried to get the
project back on track. Once again, however, the gathering of fisheries information was
combined with attempts to justify conclusions in tension with those discoveries. The
Army Corps District Engineer, Colonel Fletcher "Bud" Griffis, convened a panel of
fisheries experts to recommend how to best study the striped bass and the significance
of the Westway site. That panel recommended a twenty month, two winter study. The
district engineer agreed with this recommendation and proceeded with this decision,
New York Governor Mario Cuomo, however, caused a sort of regulatory backfire
when he sought to squelch the two winters of fisheries studies. He succeeded in
persuading the Army Corps leadership to cut the studies short. By granting Governor
Cuomo's request that only one winter of striped bass movements be studied, rather
than the twenty months recommended by the government's own fisheries experts,
Westway was put in an unfavorable regulatory posture. Then existing regulations
mandated that the Army Corps make "worst case" assumptions about impacts where
26information is uncertain. Had more information been gathered in order to create a
firmer evidentiary basis for claims of no harms or to provide evidence of lesser harms
to a greater degree of certainty, then this "worst case" assumption might have been
avoided.27 Cuomo thus accelerated the regulatory process, but he put the project on an
even more unfavorable footing, despite already facing a skeptical judge who had
earlier invalidated key project approvals.
A new draft EIS, issued in May of 1984, conceded in numerous places that there
would be significant adverse impacts on fish, especially striped bass that were
imperiled on the East Coast but abundant in the Westway interpier areas. Opponents
celebrated these concessions, although they, especially Federal natural resource
agencies, still claimed that this draft EIS was understating the significance of the
waters and the project's impacts. Still, the draft did concede "significant" fishery
impacts, whereas the first EIS claimed no adverse impacts.
Between the draft and final EIS, however, concession after concession of harm was
changed to statements that Westway would not cause harms. The Section 404 permit
24. See, e.g., PHILLIPLOPATE, WATERFRONT: AJOURNEY AROUND MANHATrAN 105 (2004)
(referring to Westway's defeat as attributable to "picayune inconsistencies" and "the judge's
dislike of a witness").
25. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, WESTWAY PROJEcr: A STUDY OF FAILURE IN
FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONS, H.R. Rep. No. 98-1166, at 52-56 (1984); STATE OFN.Y. COMM. ON
INVESTIGATION, THE WESTWAY ENVIRONMENTAL APPROVAL PROCESS: THE DILUTION OF STATE
AUTHORITY (1984).
26. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 614 F. Supp. 1475, 1483-84 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (discussing the regulatory framework and worst case analysis requirements).
27. Colonel Griffis hoped that with the two winter study he could base his permit decision
on sound data rather than worst case analysis. Under such a worst case analysis, he thought he
would have to deny the permit. In his view, the Cuomo request and Corps leadership decision
left it so there "was no way to win at that point." Interview with Colonel Fletcher Griffis,
District Engineer, Army Corps of Eng'rs (Mar. 24, 2005).
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decision similarly concluded that the project would not cause significant harms, even
when conceding that the interpier areas were unusually popular with young striped
bass. These changes were not explained in the documents themselves.
28
Armed with the final EIS and claims of compliance with the judge's earlier orders,
New York State and the other Westway advocates requested that Judge Griesa dissolve
his injunction. Opponents, however, saw the draft to final EIS changes as an
outrageous burying of the truth. Once again, but this time over federal and state
objections, Judge Griesa held hearings to determine the basis for the EIS claims. On
the eve of the trial, however, the lead United States Attorney defending the
government's actions again agreed to allow limited trial taking of evidence to test and,
he evidently hoped, justify the record and government decisions. 29
The 1985 trial stretched over several months. Once again, missteps provoked the
disbelief and ire of Judge Griesa, and they led to fairly wide ranging trial testing of
regulatory claims and decisions to approve Westway.
Different conceptions of the word "significant' were key to the government
defense. The Westway lawyers claimed the draft meant significant only in the
statistical sense of "perceptible" or measurable, while citizen opponents challenged
this claim by pointing to other language that seemed to mean far more than
"perceptible." Challengers also effectively cross examined government witnesses.
Perhaps most fatal to Westway, late in the trial a private fisheries biologist was
proffered by the government lawyers to explain the final EIS theory under which the
striped bass populations would not be harmed. In testimony that the court ultimately
found lacking in credibility and "remarkable in the annals of courtroom testimony," the
witness disavowed his own written statements about Westway impacts, conceded
general presumptions about fish populations but insisted they did not apply to
Westway, and repeatedly said he had not meant what he had written, even at the time
that he wrote it.30 Once again, the judge rejected the EIS and the underlying permits.
On appeal, the Second Circuit found the judge had overreached his appropriate role
in scrutinizing a regulatory decision, but upheld his denial due to unexplained changes
between the draft and the final EIS.3 1 When Congress cast an overwhelming vote that,
if made law, threatened to cut off all Westway fill funding and a trade-in deadline
loomed, Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo threw in the towel. After a short period of
28. See Sierra Club, 614 F. Supp. at 1490-1510 (extensively discussing the draft and final
EIS language). These unexplained changes led the trial court to conclude that the "contention of
the Corps that there was no change in conclusions from the DSEIS to the FSEIS (or no change
in conclusions as to the most probable worst case) is sheer fiction." Id. at 1501. In upholding
portions of Judge Griesa's decision about these changes, the Second Circuit started by stating,
"A change in something from yesterday to today creates doubt. When the anticipated
explanation is not given, doubt turns to disbelief." Sierra Club v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
772 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. Attorney Howard Wilson argued against "broad based inquiry into everything the Corps
was thinking." But, confronted with questions about the language changes, he conceded that
plaintiffs had reason to ask, "Was there a change in language? What does this all mean on that
narrow issue? On that narrow issue it is appropriate to have discovery and hearing .... "
Transcript of Hearing, April 4, 1985, at 24, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 614 F.
Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
30. Sierra Club, 614 F. Supp. at 1510.
31. Sierra Club, 772 F.2d at 1055-56.
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discussion with federal officials and legislators, they accepted a trade-in of almost two
billion dollars in Westway funds for transit use and a more modest replacement road.
Westway was dead.
In the Westway story, one sees the conjunction of adjudicatory permit requests
triggering information gathering and analysis and the strongly protective set of
presumptions inherent in Section 404 permit settings. At every step in the regulatory
process and the related litigation process, additional information about the state of the
Hudson's environment and the striped bass was elicited. Here, the information proved
unfavorable, which led to obfuscation or outright inaccurate claims of no harm. Still,
were it not for the Westway permit battles, far less information about the Hudson's
state and striped bass would exist today.
The imposition of burdens of proof of no harm on the permit applicants was critical
to this set of events. They had to gather supportive data to prove the absence of harm.
Equally significant, efforts to avoid information or ignore its impacts led to
unfavorable treatment before the deciding agency and later the courts.
B. The Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan and the Linked Permit Process
The CAA's SIP process is one of environmental law's quintessential ambient
environment regulatory strategies. It was implicated by Westway and led to gathering
and creation of new environmental information. This section explains, in somewhat
greater depth, how the SIP provisions and linked permit processes serve as
adjudicatory triggers of enhanced environmental information.
These sets of provisions start with the federal law's requirement that the EPA set a
cap on permissible levels of a small number of criteria pollutants through the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) process. 32 State air planning regions must
then assess their air quality and derive their plans (SIPS) about how they will attain
federal standards.33 Any categories of sources not regulated directly by federal
regulation are potentially subject to state SIP planning. When a jurisdiction is in
nonattainment by violating a NAAQS standard, then more stringent requirements must
be followed by SIP planners.
34
Of particular importance to this paper's discussion of adjudicatory trigger strategies
are the requirements in Section 7503 that new sources, in cooperation with state
planners, acquire offsets from existing sources to ensure than any new source in a
nonattainment area retires other pollution sources and contributes to progressively
cleaner air. They then can receive permits if they can meet emissions equal to the
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER). LAER, in turn, is defined in Section 7501
as the more stringent of either the most stringent limitation on a similar source in a SIP
(unless proven to be unachievable) or the most stringent limitation achieved in practice
by similar sources. Under Sections 7503 and 7509, permits are not allowed if
regulators (or later litigants and judges) determine that the SIP is not being
implemented adequately or the permit applicant is violating its regulatory obligations
at other sources.
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (2000).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), 7501-15 (2000).
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These SIP planning and linked permit requirements, especially in nonattainment
areas, constitute yet another adjudicatory trigger strategy. A proposed new source in a
nonattainment area will set in motion several kinds of information searches that enrich
the pool of data about the environment, regulatory reality, and pollution sources. The
SIP process requires ongoing assessments of actual air quality and contributors to air
degradation, and it requires ongoing identification of sources that can do better or
sources that should be encouraged to shut down. 35 Air quality must be monitored, and
the consequence of regulatory breakdowns by the regulators or the permit applicant in
nonattainment areas is mandatory permit denial.36 Even if the permittee and state
regulators are doing their jobs in accordance with the law, they must still identify
sources that can improve or shut down so there are pollution offsets creating a net
improvement to the air.3 Finally, the LAER requirement sends all permit stakeholders
searching both other SIPs and other similar pollution sources to find what is, in
essence, the state of the art in achievable pollution control.38
This nuanced series of provisions thus enlists multiple stakeholders in a search for
new information. By the time a lawful nonattainment permit is issued, all the parties
know more about regulatory status, air quality, pollution sources, and the most
stringent levels of achievable pollution control. Key here is the use of the permit
trigger to set all of this investigation in motion. As evident in the Supreme Court's
recent Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation case, the effective use of
benchmarks for regulatory obligations also makes these statutory provisions both
subject to interactive regulatory engagement and eminently enforceable in court. 39
C. Hazardous Waste Voluntary Cleanup Schemes
During its early years, the Comprehensive Response Liability, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 4° created a seemingly bottomless pit of potential liability.4'
Even sources willing to clean up contaminated sites, thus furthering CERCLA's goal
of remediating contaminated sites, typically found it impossible to know how much
cleanup would suffice, whether state or federal officials might demand more, or if a
35. Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean
AirAct, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 203,234-36 (1999) (comparing the Clean Water and Air Acts
and setting forth the sequence of information gathering and analytical state obligations under the
Clean Air Act).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(3)-(4).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A), (c).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3).
39. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,491-92 (2004) (upholding
the power of the US EPA to object to state CAA permitting choice as violating statutory
requirements).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-04 (2000).
41. William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup
Approvals, Incentives, and the Cost of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 47 (1995)
(discussing how "CERCLA's, and to a lesser extent RCRA's, broad potential liabilities are
unlimited by time, degree of culpability or causation of actual harm" thereby leading "entities
falling into a PRP category or considering involvement with a contaminated site [to] have
powerful incentives to seek a certain and final resolution to their cleanup liabilities").
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court in litigation would agree that the cleanup was sufficiently in compliance with
CERCLA's requirements.42
Since the mid-1990s, however, legal changes have reduced the degree of uncertain
residual liability risks. State laws, federal and state regulatory initiatives, and, most
recently, federal statutory amendments, have offered owners, sellers, and buyers the
possibility of largely capped liabilities. Such limited liability or even non-liability is
possible if sellers fully disclose known contamination, buyers do not exacerbate
contamination risks, and owners engage in good faith cleanups.43 The sources of law
are manifold, but the aggregate impact of these legal changes is to use owner
incentives, especially in transactional settings, to trigger disclosure and investigation of
contamination, as well as a reduction in liabilities following good faith cleanup efforts.
Here, the adjudicatory trigger is more transactional than regulatory, but increased
regulatory involvement in such voluntary cleanups ends up providing all stakeholders
with enhanced information about the property and, in many instances, also results in a
remediated site.
D. The Endangered Species Act's Numerous Adjudicatory Triggers
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is another federal law that utilizes adjudicatory
triggers in numerous key provisions. The ESA is by no means perfect. As critics have
noted, it tends to do a lot when it may be too late. 44 The law nowhere requires
comprehensive assessment of habitat to figure out what lands should be protected to
maximize biodiversity or avoid more distant species threats. Nevertheless, once its
provisions are triggered by federal agency actions or private plans that could result in
"takes" of endangered or threatened species or harms to critical habitats, then the ESA
sets in motion several interrelated provisions. These provisions require the gathering,
disclosure, consultation and analysis of information about the likely impacts of a
proposed action.45
Most significantly, when a federal agency proposes an action, it is required to
assess whether any potential endangered species effects are implicated. 46 The action
agency is obligated to consult informally with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
about such risks. This, in turn, sets in motion FWS investigation of the action and the
affected area. Where an action implicates endangered species and their habitat, then
42. Id. at 38.
43. See generally MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOEL M. GROSS, AMENDING CERCLA: THE
PosT-SARA AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (2006) (discussing and setting forth post- 1986 amendments
and related regulatory materials).
44. Michael Bhargava, OfOtters and Orcas: Marine Mammals and Legal Regimes in the
North Pacific, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 984-985 (2005) ("Although the ESA may be able to
protect an individual species from total extinction-undoubtedly an important goal-much of
the damage done to surrounding ecosystems can occur before the species is listed as threatened
or endangered.").
45. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (providing a general discussion of the ESA's
procedures and requirements in a case largely turning on issues of standing).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2000).
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the law requires more in depth investigation in the form of a biological opinion. 47 If
that, in turn, confirms conflicts between the proposed action and the ESA's strong
prohibitions on hanrs to endangered and threatened species and their habitats, then
either the action will be prohibited, or plans must be modified to avoid or mitigate the
harms.48
If private action triggers the government involvement, then it may set in motion the
government consultation process just described, or the private actor may seek approval
of a habitat conservation plan or other ameliorative actions so it can proceed despite
the possibility of an "incidental take" of such species.49
The net effect of both the government and private triggers of ESA protections is that
the proposed action triggers in depth investigation of the relevant environment and
species. The net result is a wealth of new information that may not have existed
before.
50
II. ADJUDICATORY TRIGGERS, INCENTIVES, AND REGULATORY DESIGN
The adjudicatory trigger strategies discussed above can be quite effective in
eliciting new information about the environment and regulatory efforts, but can
nevertheless leave gaping information holes. This section looks at adjudicatory trigger
strategies to assess how such strategies respond to stakeholder incentives. With
information-eliciting regulatory strategies, as is generally true in any study of
regulatory design, the key to effective regulation is realistic assessment of incentives
and tailoring of the regulatory scheme in light of those stakeholder incentives. As
policy analysts and legal experts across the country and globe struggle to devise
effective regulatory responses to greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate
change, acknowledgement of informational gaps and the benefits of informational
adjudicatory triggers could prove critical.
A. The Roots of Data Gaps
The tendency of individuals and institutions to fail to gather good information,
especially information about environmental amenities and other public goods that are
unowned, has long been noted in political economy scholarship. 5' This lack of good
information presents fundamental challenges both to effective functioning of markets
and to effective regulation or other political responses.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2000).
48. Id.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
50. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of The Endangered Species Act's
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 408 (2004) (explaining that scientists will
often be asked to assist in providing information about the effects of a proposed action in order
to provide the decision makers with the best scientific data available).
51. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1, 29-30 (2003) (discussing this literature). For the classic
work about the importance and costs of information, see George Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
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As George Stigler observed, a standard economics assumption is that markets only
perform efficiently if market actors have perfect information, yet the gathering,
disseminating, and distilling of information is costly. 52 Relatedly, political and
regulatory systems depend on accurate information if a legal or regulatory response to
a social ill is to be effective, yet adequate information is often lacking there as well.53
Where the underlying regulatory challenge involves dispersed amenities that no one
owns, such as air basins or flowing watersheds, or endangered species, accurate and
adequate information is especially unlikely to exist.
First and most significantly, absent creation of incentives through regulatory
intervention, few if any private actors are likely to see gathering of such information as
in their interest. Huge numbers of people and companies may share an interest in air or
waters on which they depend for sustenance, pleasure, and commercial use, yet that
sort of dispersed, common interest in an unowned resource makes it unlikely anyone
will invest in information gathering. Private actors cannot profit from investigation into
the state of a commons resource, and all are tempted to free ride on the efforts of
others. 54 In small community settings, especially homogenous communities with
shared social norms and capacity to socially censure those who abuse or overuse a
common resource, resources are at times protected.55 But in large, complex
environments with large populations and diverse regulators, social norms are unlikely
to overcome free rider temptations; individual market incentives to gather such
information will likely be modest to nonexistent.56 In a complex, heterogeneous
52. See Stigler, supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 115, 121 (2004) (analyzing how "information gaps lead to market failures, legal system
breakdowns, and regulatory difficulties"); Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at
10,389-91, 10,393-94, 10,419 (arguing that science can support water quality based portions of
the CWA calling for permit modifications under the Total Maximum Daily Load provisions, but
noting lack of information to support them and lack of money to find the necessary
information); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DuKE L.J. 1619, 1623-1624
(2004) ("[M]uch of the scientific information needed to ensure environmental protection is still
missing. The quality of most air, water, and land in the U.S. is unknown, even though the
country has devoted hundreds of pages of laws to regulating activities that threaten the
environment.").
54. See Buzbee, supra note 51, at 18.
55. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1991). See generally Carol M. Rose,
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991
DuKEL.J. 1 (1991).
56. See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 379, 407-11 (2000) (arguing that the Chesapeake Bay Program's
successes are partly attributable to the fact that it involves a limited number of actors with
similar interests, and contrasting failures in watersheds with a greater number of interested
parties and attendant free rider problems); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting
as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 379,439-
41 (2005) (analyzing why private parties lack incentives to produce environmental performance
information due to its "public good" nature and inability to capture benefits of producing the
information); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 325, 334-37 (1992) (criticizing Garrett Hardin of "simply assum[ing] the problem away.
Confronted by a community, the structure of which makes coordination seemingly impossible,
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country like the United States, it is unlikely that private incentives will lead to good
information about environmental amenities.57
Similarly, government actors have few incentives to gather such information. First
and most importantly, with dispersed natural resources, multiple government actors are
likely to share interests, but no one regulator is likely to see a river, airshed, global
atmosphere, or rare species as its particular responsibility.58 With the underlying
resource lacking a particular jurisdictional link, no single regulator will have incentives
to invest in costly gathering and analysis of information about that amenity. As I have
written in the past, if a natural resource or harm to a natural resource is not matched
with a particular government actor or a particular jurisdiction, then citizens concerned
about the resource will be unsure about where to turn for government action. 59 Citizen
demands, therefore, will be dispersed or will simply not be made. The net impact is
that neither citizens nor regulators will feel that that regulatory challenge is theirs to
solve. In such "regulatory commons" settings, essential information will therefore
often remain lacking.
Data gaps are especially likely where the underlying information will lead to
political or business disadvantage.6° Information gaps are a particular risk when
dealing with a degraded environment. Although this nation's environmental laws allow
a substantial amount of pollution to continue, virtually all of those laws require more
stringent regulation and sometimes veto of proposed actions where the relevant
environment is degraded or regulatory actors are failing to do their job. In the Westway
story, for example, both the CAA permit and the Section 404 dredge and fill permit
threatened to be denied due to the possibility that they would make a bad
he admonishes it... to coordinate!").
57. See Esty, supra note 53, at 185 (arguing that private parties often take advantage of
information gaps and form small, well-organized groups to distort existing information, while
the relatively disorganized general public cannot coordinate to stop them); Kenneth M.
Murchison, Learning From More than Five and a Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution
Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 527, 585
(2005) (arguing that due to EPA's dependence on industry information, regulated industries had
incentives to overstate compliance costs).
58. See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 163-67 (2005) (arguing that efforts to create a comprehensive picture
of ecosystem health are hampered by chronically incomplete private, state, and EPA data
collection); Buzbee, supra note 51, at 9 (providing an example of this in the context of the
"regulatory commons" problem); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives,
and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1692 (1991) (stating that the SIP process of the
CAA "imposes overlapping functions that create uncertainty about which institution(s) must
make the hard choices necessary for attainment. If federal, state, and regional regulators are all
responsible for attainment, each agency can blame the others when compliance is not
achieved."); cf James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309,316-17 (2001)
(explaining New York City's successful protection of its watershed and avoidance of costly
water treatment requirements as resulting from the fact that New York was the only player,
eliminating free rider problems and allowing the city to assess its costs and benefits).
59. See Buzbee, supra note 51.
60. See Wagner, supra note 53, at 1633-37 (arguing that where information will reveal
externalities, there is a double disincentive to produce it because production costs will not be
recouped and, second, the information may create additional losses in the market and through
legal requirements and liabilities).
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environmental situation even worse. With the Section 404 permit, the protective
statutory presumptions apparently provoked Westway's proponents to avoid data
collection, bury harmful data, and deny its apparent implications. But they could not
altogether avoid such data collection and analysis; the permit adjudicatory triggers
under CAA, CWA, and linked NEPA analysis forced them at least to make a
semblance of required data collection and analysis. The CAA lawyers and engineers
devised a cure. Section 404's far more protective presumptions, and the striking
importance of the Westway interpier areas to striped bass, provided citizen and NGO
opponent with enough data and strong legal hooks to mount an effective challenge.
Westway was an extreme case in its size and its complete defeat, but the regulatory
dynamics it revealed were not unusual. To avoid more burdensome regulation or veto
of proposed projects, business actors and politicians eager to attract business will often
have natural incentives not to uncover harmful information. Where the problematic
information concerns regulatory failures such as failures to enforce the law, meet
planning commitments, or fund required activities, regulators will naturally seek to
avoid embarrassing revelations. The net effect of these incentives, in the setting of
cross-jurisdictional environmental concerns or degraded environments, is that
information about the state of the environment and regulatory status will tend to be
under-produced, at least absent some countervailing regulatory incentive.
B. Ambient Environment Regulatory Schemes and Information Gaps
Ambient environment schemes are particularly problematic. At their most basic,
they require regulators to figure out the state of the relevant environment, to engage in
a sort of reverse engineering that allocates regulatory burdens in light of the state of the
receiving environment, and then in an ongoing way to keep such information current,
further adjusting regulatory requirements. 6' Such schemes thus require information
that is often at the limit of human knowledge and scientific capabilities, plus such
regulatory strategies require ongoing vigilance and regulatory zeal of sorts that are
seldom observed in studies of regulatory behavior. As observed by Professor Houck,
ambient based water quality management requires a tremendous amount of "current,
continuous, and definitive" 62 information and demands "more of science than it can
deliver. The issues turn out to be more complex than imagined. They require
extrapolations of causes and effects-be they over toxicity, carcinogenicity,
persistence, bioaccumulation, exposure pathways, synergy, dilution, or distribution-
that are rarely dispositive and highly susceptible to challenge. 63
Many scholars note the frequent failures of such schemes. Perhaps the most
egregious failed regulatory scheme is the Clean Water Act's Total Maximum Daily
Load (TMDL) provisions. The TMDL program lacks the sort of adjudicatory trigger
element that can prod reluctant private and government actors to gather and act on
information about the environment. 64 Instead, the TMDL program hinges on an initial
61. See Murchison, supra note 57, at 595 (observing that "[almbient-based controls present
greater difficulty than feasibility-based controls" due to how they "require regulators to consider
the interaction between multiple sources of pollution and a dynamic body of water").
62. Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at 10,389.
63. Id. at 10,406.
64. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA
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burden on state regulators to rank river segments for uses and then assess which are
degraded. Then, water quality segments are supposed to be evaluated to determine
what maximum daily load of pollutants they can bear and meet their designated uses.
Only then are regulatory burdens on polluters adjusted, with regulators expected to
ratchet back technology-based permits in areas with impaired waters.
In contrast to schemes that combine adjudicatory trigger elements with ambient
environmental strategies, the TMDL provisions harness none of the incentives of
assorted stakeholders to elicit and analyze relevant information. 65 Even the TMDL
provision's regulatory sanctions and litigation threats are toothless.66 The main federal
threat is to take over the state's obligations, yet the federal government is even less
suited to make the array of locally sensitive decisions than are the states. 67
Certainly,permittees have no incentive to prompt more vigorous enforcement.68 Only
beneficiaries have incentives to push all to clean up America's waters, but they too
lack necessary resources and do not have a viable litigation threat.69 Unsurprisingly,
TMDL obligations went largely unimplemented throughout the United States until
over a decade after they became law. Only citizen suits and, later, judicial injunctive
relief began to turn this scheme into at least a partially implemented reality.
70
ST. U. L. REv. 861, 889-90 (2006) (arguing that EPA and the states generally ignored the
requirement to propagate TMDLs until citizen suits in the late 1980s "successfully advanced the
theory that persistent failure to submit the required lists amounted to 'constructive submission'
of inadequate lists, obligating the EPA to impose TMDLs where states had failed to do so");
Murchison, supra note 57, at 573-78 (explaining uncertain chain of regulatory obligations and
enforcement options under the TMDL provisions).
65. See Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 2, at 10,403 (arguing that because
private point sources pay their own abatement costs while the government generally pays
abatement costs for private nonpoint sources, this dichotomy has "created an attitude within the
nonpoint industry of an entitlement to pollute akin to a property right"); see Murchison, supra
note 56, at 586-87 (arguing that nonpoint sources of pollution have essentially been excluded
from the regulatory framework).
66. See Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at 10,412-13 (arguing that EPA's
response to state failures under the Clean Air Act demonstrated that EPA's threat to take over
state regulation in the TMDL setting was not credible).
67. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTh. L. REv. 297, 303 (1999) (arguing that
EPA does not have the resources to assume primary responsibility for any state enforcement
program).
68. See Murchison, supra note 57, at 597 ("Government entities establish regulations
because environmental controls increase costs of regulated entities without improving their
revenues. Predictably, regulated entities try to minimize those costs. Regulations work most
effectively when cooperation is less costly than defiance.").
69. See Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at 10,411-12 (arguing that citizens
are no longer able to sue EPA to force it to promulgate TMDLs because EPA shifted
implementation planning from § 303(d) to §§ 303(e) and 319).
70. See Id. at 10,403 (discussing role of citizen enforcement and court decrees in prompting
TMDL implementation); Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Ended the 2000 TMDL
Program, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 63, 78 (2002) ("It took twenty-five years and a number of
citizen suits to compel the states even to begin their part of the process by listing impaired
waters .. "); Murchison, supra note 57, at 573-78 (tracing history of citizen suit enforcement
in TMDL setting).
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Similarly, prior to the early 1970s amendments of the CAA and CWA, these laws
were substantially based on precatory provisions that sought to encourage states to
assess and clean up the environment. Lacking permit triggers or realistic sanction
elements, little was actually accomplished. 7' Only when they were amended to their
current forms, utilizing a hybrid of technology-based permits with mixed degrees of
sensitivity to environmental conditions, with far more enforceable commands, was
substantial progress made.72
Where regulatory provisions lack adjudicatory triggers and realistic litigation
threats that can lead to meaningful sanctions, regulatory drift and other forms of
"regulatory underkill" become particularly likely.73 As Daniel Farber and Howard
Latin nicely capture in articles cataloguing regulatory proclivities and reasons for
regulatory failure, heroic expectations for regulators tend to lead to disappointment. 
74
At a minimum, as Farber explains, "slippage" from statutory goals occurs. As with the
TMDL programs, sometimes complete implementation failure is the result. When one
factors in the frequent reality of inadequate funding of environmental agencies and
excessive regulatory tasks, especially new requirements to analyze costs, benefits,
federalism impacts, small business implications and the like, regulators are often easily
derailed from zealous regulatory enforcement. Factoring in the frequent additional
layers of delegation of federal programs to state regulators, there is yet more room for
slippage from statutory goals.75
In short, regulatory provisions tend to perform poorly when they rely only on the
hope for regulatory zeal to assess and clean up the environment. Either the assigned
regulatory task needs to rely on sometimes crude but still determinable information
71. See Murchison, supra note 57, at 530-35 (arguing that pre-1970 water pollution control
acts provided little enforcement power to the federal government and little was actually done to
clean up the water).
72. See Houck, Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at 10,396 (arguing that before
1972-when Congress provided for EPA oversight and citizen enforcement of pollution control
laws-states had neither the ability nor political will to enforce antipollution laws); Malone,
supra note 70, at 77 (arguing that by imposing uniform technology based standards for point
sources, the 1972 Act created permits that could be monitored and enforced); Murchison, supra
note 57, at 534 (contrasting lack of progress prior to 1972 and later changes that improved
Clean Water accomplishments).
73. See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Underkill in an Era of Anti-Environmental
Majorities, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE
141 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2005) [hereinafter STRATEGIES].
74. See Farber, supra note 67, at 311,316 (stating that Congress often passes "unrealistic or
symbolic statutes" that may be thought of as "the government's opening demand in
negotiations"); Latin, supra note 58, at 1718-19 (arguing that implementation falls short
because Congress does not "assess realistically the incentives of the people who must make
regulatory programs work").
75. See Farber, supra note 67, at 303-04, 312-13 (observing that states are uneven in their
compliance with federal statutes and the EPA lacks the resources to monitor them); Houck,
Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 1, at 10,395 (reporting that in 2001 the EPA inspector
general found "that the states were wanting in every aspect of enforcement [of the Clean Water
Act] from identifying violators, to taking enforcement actions, to the assessment of penalties
and fines"); Latin, supra note 58, at 1692-93 (arguing that shared responsibility between the
states and the federal government provides another opportunity for enforcement to slip).
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such as best technology-based standards, or more environmentally sensitive schemes
need to rely on adjudicatory triggers that align private incentives of both polluters and
citizen opponents to prod regulators and supply them with information.
III. PROBLEMS OF ADJUDICATORY TRIGGER STRATEGIES AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
This Article's cataloguing of the benefits of adjudicatory trigger strategies should
not be mistaken for a paean to their perfection. Such schemes can work well, but they
too can fail, plus they also lack a few key elements that could render them far more
effective.
A. Problems
Adjudicatory trigger strategies promise enhanced information and effective
utilization of stakeholder incentives, but they also threaten to fall short of their
idealized potential. The factors contributing to such shortcomings can be broken down
into two basic categories: failures to share and compile information, and risks that
unequal resources and incentives will skew the information that is ultimately elicited.
The biggest downside of adjudicatory trigger strategies is that they tend to create
piecemeal analysis. One EIS does not necessarily build on past EIS studies. One
permit's analyses may never be plugged into later similar permit proceedings. Many
such triggers elicit quite specific information about a geographically limited area.
Because they tend to require substantial information about the environment and
anticipated impacts on it, they are forward looking. Seldom do any provisions of
federal law create requirements or even modest incentives for private actors or
76regulators to look back at past analyses and predictions to assess their accuracy.
Thus, in the Westway story, one finds an array of actors seeking to bury the truth or
skew their analyses. If they had succeeded, no legal provisions would have later led to
76. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-250, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF EPA'S REGULATIONS THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE
STUDIES (1999) (analyzing the extreme rarity of retrospective analysis of past EPA regulations
and outlining some of the potential uses and challenges of retrospective studies); Michael B.
Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to Improve the Environmental
Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 18, 26-30 (2003) (suggesting placing
environmental impact statements online as a necessary step toward meaningful retrospective
analysis, stating that under such a system, "[r]ather than reinventing the wheel with each EIS,
preparers could draw on the work of those who preceded them"); Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth
Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEx. L.
REv. 1997, 1998-99 (2002) (suggesting that retrospective empirical cost assessments would
help check systematic overestimates of industry regulatory compliance costs in prospective
cost-benefit analysis, but that such assessments will not be performed unless current economic
incentives are altered). Such retrospective analysis does pose its own risks. See James T.
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16
STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 159, 162 (1997) ("The increase in reporting requirements for regulators
spurred by the detailed retrospective regulatory assessments and other reports to Congress
required by some bills, coupled with proposed cuts in agency budgets, would lead to regulatory
gridlock.").
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assessment of the accuracy of such claims or punishment if found to be in error. The
CAA is an unusual counter example, with its use of nonattainment permits to trigger
assessments of the environment, regulators' actual diligence, and the state of the art in
pollution control.
Nevertheless, adjudicatory trigger strategies, like most regulatory schemes, rely on
the presence of opponents to challenge facile or false informational claims, nudge
regulators to do their job, and possibly initiate litigation where necessary. Seldom,
however, will there be citizens with adequate time or monetary resources, let alone
skill and knowledge, to participate effectively in such settings. Regulators will have
professional staff, and private actors seeking permits will have expert consultants.
Adjudicatory trigger strategies will ideally create enhanced information, but in reality
threaten to be skewed by unequal resources and analyst bias.
B. Solutions for Adjudicatory Trigger Strategy Shortcomings
This Section catalogs several antidotes to such risk factors. Concededly, however,
some of these curative responses contain an element of circularity; resource constraints
and skewed incentives will remain problems unless corrective strategies that counteract
unequal resources are put in place. Despite assuming away a chief cause of the
underlying problem, this Section nevertheless proposes curative measures. The
curative efforts would harness self interest with incentives for effective participation
by stakeholders who threaten to go unheard. As in many areas of environmental and
risk regulation, retention and even revival of judicial oversight is critical.
Methodical cataloguing and retention of environmental information is critical. With
web access to many agency databases, it is no longer far fetched to ask agencies
methodically to take information adduced through adjudicatory trigger events and
index them by site and threatened resource. Similar sorts of databases have been
collected in connection with the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), allowing interested
citizens to search by location and determine what toxics are released in the area.
77
Were such databases coordinated and searchable, especially if state and local studies
were included, then the often isolated and episodic nature of adjudicatory trigger
information might be alleviated over time.78
Still, more than mere compilation and indexing is needed. Much of NEPA's
analysis and analogous information produced due to other adjudicatory trigger schemes
is prospective in nature, predicting what will occur in the future. Underlying baseline
condition analysis remains critical to such schemes, but the predictive elements-
predictions of how a proposed action will affect the environment-typically remain no
more than predictions. Few of these schemes require any sort of "lookback" or
retrospective analysis to see how well analysts did, to assess how the project or
permitted activity compared to its promise, or to collect data that analyzes actual
environmental impacts. CAA nonattainment permitting contains a variant on a
lookback scheme, at least making the next desired permit a trigger to assess how the
polluter and regulator have actually been doing, while also updating information about
77. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEo. L.J. 257 (2001)
(discussing the effectiveness of the TRI).
78. Gerrard & Herz, supra note 76, at 27-28.
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pollution control technology. 79 Few other such schemes, however, contain similar
mandates or incentives for lookback.
Even if such lookback requirements became more pervasively required, the problem
of skewed resources and incentives would remain. Regulators and permit seekers
would have resources to undertake necessary gathering and analysis of information,
but citizens and other interested parties, who typically lack a substantial monetary or
judicially created incentive for creation and analysis of information, would remain
comparatively disadvantaged. Information about the state of the environment, let alone
information about how someone else's proposed project will affect the environment, is
costly to gather and requires great skill to analyze. A bottom line reality is that citizens
and other more tangentially interested stakeholders will need the assistance of
scientists, and often help from engineers and attorneys as well.80 At this time, apart
from limited funding provided by CERCLA for neighbors seeking to participate in
decisions about how to remediate a contaminated site, few laws at any level provide a
mechanism to ameliorate resource imbalances during the often lengthy regulatory
investigation and review stage. Should citizens later bring a meritorious claim in
litigation, those litigation expenses may be subject to an attorney's fee and cost reward
under federal "citizen suit" provisions, but none of the often far longer and more
expensive costs of the regulatory stages will be recoverable.
Several responses to this challenge are possible. First, laws should be amended to
provide financial assistance for citizens participating in regulatory proceedings, at least
where (as with such litigation-stage awards), citizens can show how their participation
provided a benefit by, for example, serving as a check against inaccurate or insufficient
claims or analyses of the permittees or regulators. Ideally, such a subsidization strategy
would provide both initial modest funding to facilitate citizen participation and a more
substantial cost or fee award upon later proof of the importance of the citizen role.
Some might complain, however, that such a proposal effectively seeks to empower
citizens to perform a role duplicating what regulators already do. Tax dollars are
already paid so the government can provide such functions. Ideally, this would be true.
The reality, however, is that regulators are regularly overextended and subject to
repeated encounters with permittees. Even without making assumptions of regulatory
capture, corruption or venality on the part of regulators, it is empirically justifiable to
assume that regulators will often fail to perform their tasks. In the Westway story, one
sees some diligent regulators, but also other regulators who failed to act, acquiesced in
misleading claims, and even affirmatively made what federal courts concluded were
misstatements. Moreover, government actors frequently are not disinterested
79. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
80. Of course, a highly motivated and intelligent citizen can develop expertise and serve in
such a role. In the Westway battles, Marcy Benstock was a critical strategic force. She was a
citizen opponent and head of the NGO, the Clean Air Campaign. As she emphatically pointed
out, federal environmental and natural resource agencies provided critical, pointed criticisms of
Westway, and many other groups, including local, state, and federal legislators were aligned
opponents. Still, she provided critical continuity and information to opponents and the press.
See Jack Newfield, Marcy Benstock: The Woman Who Blocked Westway, in THE EDUCATION OF
JACK NEWFIELD 169 (1984). For discussion of the importance of a project stewards to a complex
project's success, see Buzbee, supra note 6, at 348-50, 355.
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regulators, but themselves the entities seeking a permit or violating the law by failing
to protect the resource. A citizen "checking" role is a necessary reality.
In suggesting that citizen participatory roles be subsidized or even later rewarded
with compensation of costs and fees, this Article is concededly running counter to
judicial trends. Citizen standing in the courts has been subject to judicial rollback since
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife8 1 was decided in the early 1990s.9 2 Recent cases have
revived or at least preserved a citizen role under such provisions, but other
justiciability doctrines have cut the other way. Most recently, in the Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance case, 83 the Supreme Court made it extraordinarily difficult
under the Administrative Procedure Act for a citizen to bring suit alleging unlawful
failures to act unless able to allege discrete violations of required activities.
84
Similarly, fee award rights have been undercut. 85 The net effect of these judicial
cutbacks on citizen litigation rights is that any improved adjudicatory trigger schemes
relying on citizen involvement will have to make the right to an award even more
explicit than under current law.
Critically important to adjudicatory trigger schemes is how burdens of proof are
allocated. If the pervasive uncertainties and costs associated with environmental
information are effectively imposed on citizen participants in regulatory proceedings,
then rarely will citizens succeed in challenging a permit grant. Similarly, if
governments must overcome a burden before they can say "no" or require a permittee
to modify plans, then there too permit grants will seldom meet with denial. Only if the
permittee or entity seeking adjudicatory approval carries the burden to establish that
resulting harms will be modest and acceptable will information be elicited and will a
realistic possibility of government and citizen oversight exist. Recent proposals and
enactments requiring "peer reviewed" science or proof of data quality threaten to
impose insurmountable hurdles if imposed on governments or objectors.86 Imperfect
information and limited resources mean that seldom will anyone be able to establish
claims to a certainty that are adequate to survive peer review.
Lastly, retention of redundant and overlapping participation and enforcement
schemes is important to the success of adjudicatory trigger strategies. The reality is that
most events serving as a regulatory adjudicatory trigger will sail through review
procedures with few challenges. 87 Preserving the roles of multiple actors with different
81. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
82. See William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen Enforcement, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds.) (2005) at 214-24
(analyzing case trends following Lujan).
83. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
84. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Following the Court Off-Road in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, in STRATEGIES, supra note 73, at 215; Robert L. Glicksman, Securing
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction (and Action) in the Wake of Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, in STRATEGIES, supra note 73, at 163.
85. See, e.g., Buckannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting "catalyst" theory for awards of attorney's fees).
86. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection:
The Perils of Reform By Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 339,
347-48 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,064 (2004).
87. For example, the Army Corps recently reported that only one percent of Section 404
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goals and areas of expertise reduces the risk that environmental information will be
overlooked or misrepresented. By retaining this multiplicity of actors, more proposals
will meet with defeat or requirements that they be modified. This possibility of
scrutiny and defeat, however, is critical to keep the process honest.
CONCLUSION
Adjudicatory triggers of enhanced environmental information are a useful
regulatory strategy, but are far from a panacea. Still, they can serve as a useful
complement to other strategies and will typically elicit information that might
otherwise be lacking or out of date. As in most areas of environmental and risk
regulation, checks on lax regulatory behavior and tailoring of information and
uncertainty burdens will be critical to success in protecting the environment.
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